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A B S T R A C T
Catch-based aquaculture (CBA) is an important production system in many parts of the world, especially in developing countries. In Norway CBA is based on capture
and storage/farming of mature, North-east Atlantic (NEA) cod (Gadus morhua). The objective is to reduce seasonal variations and add value, by storing/farming fish
to take advantage of higher prices in low seasons. Despite numerous development programs and economic incentives, the development of the CBA business has been
slow. Few actors are storing fish long enough to take advantage of high price in low season. A reason for this is that CBA is caught in between two sectors: the fisheries
and aquaculture, with radically different institutional frameworks, creating entry barriers and a complex regulatory framework. Moreover, the legitimacy of the CBA
is in question, as CBA intervene into the resource allocation mechanism in traditional fisheries. Still, it is too early to conclude that CBA has failed, as we are dealing
with an industry in the making.
1. Introduction
According to FAO [1], catch-based aquaculture (CBA) is an im-
portant production system, especially in developing countries and rural
fisheries-dependent regions.1 Regional socio-economic spin-off effects
of CBA are employment, small business development and expanded
market opportunities. Although available statistics of global CBA pro-
duction is limited, FAO estimated that 20% of global marine aqua-
culture production stems from CBA, representing a total value of US $
1.7 billion [2,3]. Examples of CBA include tuna (Thunus spp.) in Aus-
tralia, Japan, Canada, Spain and Mexico; milkfish (Chanos chanos) in
the Philippines and Indonesia; eel (Anguille spp.) in Asia, Europe, Aus-
tralia and North-America and grouper (Epinephelus spp.) in Asia. De-
mand for valuable species in high paying international markets have
been the driving force for the development of CBA [1]. Although, global
CBA are mostly based on capture of wild juvenile fish and fry for
farming [3], Norwegian CBA of North East Atlantic (NEA) cod (Gadus
morhua) is one example of CBA based on storage or farming of wild-
caught, mature cod. In this case, CBA adds value to limited quotas in
the coastal fisheries. This latter approach may also be an alternative
production system to cod farming, based on hatched juveniles. The
main objective of Norwegian CBA is to reduce seasonal variations in
landings of cod to stabilize the supply of fresh raw material throughout
the year and thereby increase the value creation in the whitefish sector.
The rationale is that, cod sold outside the main winter season (Jan–A-
pril) will receive higher prices [4] (Fig. 1).
Traditionally, the large landings of cod in the winter season
(Jan–April), generates lower prices, compared to the autumn season
(Aug–Dec), when less cod is available. This seasonal landing pattern
also challenge fish quality and capacity adaptations in both the fleet
and the processing industry. Moreover, seasonality restricts employ-
ment stability and creates dependency on a few products and export
markets. As the NEA cod fishery is the most valuable fishery, stable
supply of fresh NEA cod has been a central fisheries political goal for
decades.2 Although small-scale CBA was established in the 1960s and
1970s in mid-Norway, modern and larger scale CBA was first launched
at the end of the 1980s.3 A decline in the NEA cod stock in 1989-1992,
historically low quotas and unsuccessful traditional cod farming trig-
gered the development of CBA, as a measure to add value to the limited
quotas in the coastal fleet. The result was several CBA initiatives, pri-
marily in the northernmost counties, particularly in Finnmark and
Nordland [9]. Since then, CBA has been a political priority. The
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1 In this work we refer to CBA as the entire process dealing with live fish; from capture, through storage and aquaculture, to processing and sales.
2 The industrialization of the cod sector, based on vertical integration between land-based fillet production and the construction of over 60 trawlers in the 1960s
and 1970s, is the most prominent attempt to stabilize annual cod supply [5]. However, due to lack of economic efficiency and allocation conflicts between the trawl
fleet and the processing plants, this industrial model was not able to fulfill political goals for the cod sector [6,7].
3 CBA of cod in the 1960s and 1970s was practiced by using fish-pots. The activity was organized through the sales organization Norsk levendelagring (Norwegian
live storage). Norsk levendelagring ended in 1972 when it merged with the Norwegian Fishermen's Sales Organization (NFSO) [8].
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Norwegian Research Council and regional development agencies have
financed numerous research and development programs with the ob-
jective to make CBA economic viable, increase value of the cod fisheries
and curb seasonal fluctuations [4,10].
In addition to development programs, the government also stimu-
lates CBA through the quota-bonus scheme, introduced in 2008 (to be
described later). Another stimulus is the minimum price, as the
Norwegian Fishermen's Sales Organization (NFSO) sets the minimum
price for live cod higher than that of traditional cod [11]. However,
despite significant public incentives and price differentiation, CBA has
developed slower than expected. This article addresses this issue and
asks the following questions:
1. What are the institutional framework for CBA and how must actors
comply to conduct CBA?
2. What potential CBA business models are available and how have
actors organized value chains to conduct CBA?
3. What institutional barriers should be changed to stimulate more
CBA for cod?
The article is organized as follows: in section two, we give a short
description of methodological approach. In section three, we give some
background of the CBA, as well as outline the main elements of the
regulatory framework applicable to CBA. We also introduce the theo-
retical framework for analyzing CBA as production system, with special
emphasize on institutional aspects that regulate different models for
CBA. In section four, we present the empirical findings of how actors
organize CBA production systems. In section five and six, discussion and
conclusion, we suggest institutional changes to the CBA framework,
which may contribute to increase CBA among coastal fishers and other
small-scale actors.
2. Method
This article explores regulative and institutional aspects of orga-
nizing CBA value chains. In the case of CBA for NEA cod, regulative and
regulative elements, such as the Participation Act (PA) [12] and the
Aquaculture Act (AA) [13], communicate imperatives of how to orga-
nize production structures. Thus, the interpretation of regulative in-
structions in combination with the actual results may reveal informa-
tion about the strength of the management system.
To explore CBA, we use a qualitative approach consisting analysis of
secondary literature sources to describe how actors within CBA adapt to
the legal framework and arrange value chains. Here, we draw on
sources such as scientific reports, research articles, public policy papers,
legislative publications, newspaper articles as well some statistics from
the CBA industry. The literature is supplemented by some interviews
carried out relation to the report Live storage – a future business [14].
3. Institutional framework for CBA production system
3.1. Mapping regulative aspects for CBA
As this paper examines the link between regulative institutions and
policies in the development of CBA, our approach aligns well with
Oliver's definition of institutions as “regulatory structures, govern-
mental agencies, laws and professions” [15]. In addition, as Dobbin and
Dowds [16], we see new policies as both institutional constraints and
incentives, affecting the design of institutions, and in turn the CBA
industry. In this process, the legitimacy of new institutional structures is
central. Within fisheries and aquaculture, institutions have developed
over decades, in which the CBA industry directly intervenes. Hence,
CBA may precede institutional change and challenge existing institu-
tions [16].
CBA is fundamentally linked to both traditional fisheries and
aquaculture. Consequently, the production system operates within a
complex institutional framework inherited from both sectors. In terms
of capture of live fish, the vessels must have access to harvest fish. Due
to the closing of the commons and the introduction of modern fisheries
management, the individual vessel quota (IVQ) system was introduced
in 1991 for coastal vessels. Since 2004, the original IVQ model have
been subject to a strong market orientation with an objective to reduce
the numbers of vessels and thus strengthen the quota-base for the re-
maining vessels (that is, increase quotas per vessel). Depending on the
size of the vessels, coastal vessels can buy and concentrate up to five
quota factors pr. vessel. Hence, within the same vessel category, coastal
vessels may have different quota-bases.4
To increase CBA activity, the quota-bonus was implemented. The
quota-bonus allows vessels that lands fish within the framework of CBA
to deduct only 50% off the vessel cod quota. That is, if a vessel lands
1000 kg live cod and stores it live for a minimum of one week, the
vessel is only deducted 500 kg from its cod quota [4,12,13]. In 2016,
4000 tons from the national total allowable catch (TAC) was allocated
to the quota-bonus scheme, representing 8000 tons of live fish land-
ings.5 Moreover, cod prices favor CBA, as the average price of live cod
Fig. 1. Seasonality in the NEA cod fisheries showing landings (tons) and price (NOK/kg), 2015–2017 [4].
4 For a review of the Norwegian quota system, see e.g. Hannesson [17] and
Standal and Asche [18].
5 While 2015 and 2016 were record years for CBA, there seem to be a slight
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was about 26 NOK/kg in 2016, while traditional HG (headed and
gutted) cod was 20 NOK/kg [20]. In the period 2004 to 2016, the ab-
solute price difference between live and traditional HG cod has been
relatively stable, at about 4 NOK/kg, in favor of live cod [21]. Re-
gardless of the vessels' quota-bases, the CBA quota-bonus applies
equally to all vessels awarded cod quotas. For coastal vessels, the CBA
quota-bonus may thus add a significant value to a limited quota-base.
Besides the design of the quota regime and the quota-bonus, a
number of regulations are of importance for CBA: The regulations of
vessels that shall fish and store live fish and The regulation of the practice of
fishing in saltwater (chapter XVIII) [22]. The first regulation secures that
vessels are equipped to handle live fish in terms of animal welfare. This
also requires that the Norwegian Food Safety Authority approve the
vessel for CBA [23]. The second regulation ensures that fish is handled
with care when captured and transported; hence, requires that workers
get the necessary formal training in the methods used, including
knowledge regarding animal welfare.6
In terms of storage, or aquaculture, CBA is separated into two dis-
tinct phases: storage less than 12 weeks7 and storage over 12 weeks
(farming/aquaculture). If the objective of the CBA is to be fulfilled,
more fish needs to be stored into the fall and over 12 weeks. As storage
over 12 weeks is defined as aquaculture, the CBA operations must
comply with both the CBA Regulation [21] and the Aquaculture Act
(AA) [13] and its regulations.
The CBA regulation affords permits to carry out CBA, including
regulation of locality, operation, slaughter and transport. The owner is
responsible for the biomass and the operation of the facility. This in-
cludes risk-based supervision in relation to environment, fish health
and welfare, installations, technical facilities and production equip-
ment. The regulation also requires formal aquaculture competence
[13].
The AA requires an aquaculture license assigned to a specific op-
erator and species, at a distinct location and phase in the lifecycle of the
species. This requires that the operations are environmentally sound,
and have taken spatial planning and conservation plans, as well as other
stakeholders' spatial interests, into account. Moreover, an operational
plan is mandatory, which includes plans for production volume and
fallowing, disease emergency plan, animal welfare and escapes; as well
as risk-based health examinations and daily feeding [13].
Hence, the regulatory framework that a CBA business has to man-
euver is complex and tied to years of institutional development in both
sectors, ultimately affecting the design and development of the nascent
CBA industry.
3.2. Models for vertical coordination
Another issue, also related to the institutional framework, concerns
coordination of CBA as a production system. For an actor to engage in
CBA, investments in terms of material, time and knowledge must pay
off. For instance, a fisher must investment in a vessel suitable for
catching and carrying live fish. Fishing live fish is a more complex and
time-consuming activity than traditional fisheries; thus, time is an im-
portant input factor. Consequently, the minimum price set by the NFSO
must cover the various extra investments and risks involved.8 Similarly,
a fish farmer or processor entering CBA must invest in necessary
technology and knowledge. For controlling the supply of live fish, an
actor must be eligible to participate in the commercial fisheries [12].
The bottom line is, given the investments and risks that CBA entails,
CBA must be at least as profitable as ordinary business activities.
As CBA combines traditional fisheries and aquaculture into a new
production system, a central question is what business models are
available, or chosen, and how do these affect transaction costs?9
Transaction costs are central to our analysis, as we assume that a chosen
organizational model represents the lowest rate of transaction costs.
Williamson [25,26] introduces the term governance structure to char-
acterize different actors' choice of transaction models, which includes
the framework surrounding transactions. Specific governance structures
include factors affecting transaction costs, such as legal aspects, com-
munication, predictability and control of resources. The choice between
free market models or full vertical integration models deals with how
governance structures affect business transactions costs.
Consequently, choice of business models affects investments, in-
cluding tangible and intangible assets. Tangible assets are specific in-
vestments directed towards a specific production system, such as in-
vestments in a vessel for transport and pens for storage of live cod.
Intangible assets refers to human capital and contracts to stabilize re-
lations between actors to reduce transaction costs. Human capital is
especially important when transactions are technically complicated, as
there is opportunism, actors do not comply with agreements or there is
a need for routines. Hence, complexity and uncertainty may be barriers
for rational choices and reduced transaction costs [26].
We use two ideal-type models as a point of departure: the free
market competition model, in which actors are independent transaction
partners and the fully integrated model, in which transactions are in-
ternalized in a vertically integrated value chain. There is also a range of
models in between these two extremes (Fig. 2). In the following, we will
examine possible ideal-type business models in CBA.
3.2.1. Free market competition
The theory of free market competition assumes that actors have full
information regarding all possible actions and competitors. It also as-
sumes that transaction relations only apply to the individual transac-
tion, with no institutional binding to each other. Model 1 in Fig. 2 il-
lustrates free market competition, in which the CBA actors in the value
chain are independent decisions makers interacting on a transaction-to-
transaction basis [27]. Hence, a fisher will capture the fish, sell it to an
actor that stores and maintains the fish live for less than 12 weeks, or
farm the fish over 12 weeks, before it is slaughtered and sold to a
processing plant or exported as round fish. This model does not sig-
nificantly challenge existing institutions, as transactions between the
various actors are separated and the legal responsibility and risk would
lie with the individual actor at each stage in the value chain. However,
fishers must invest in live storage systems on vessels and actors in
storage or aquaculture would have to invest in technology for trans-
porting and storing/farming fish, as well as knowledge related to this.
3.2.2. Forward integration
The second model is where fishers integrate forward in the value
chain and stores fish in a pen for up to 12 weeks (known as fish hotels),
or more than 12 weeks (aquaculture) [28,29]. Besides technologies for
live storage and aquaculture pens, forward integration entails invest-
ments in skills and knowledge. A scenario, where the fisher owns the
production facilities and the fish, the mortality- and economic risk
would lie with the fisher [30–32]. If a fisher, or a fish hotel owner,
choose to integrate forward one more step and enter the aquaculture,
the investments increases further in form of aquaculture facilities and
(footnote continued)
decline in 2017, with only 17 vessels participating. There are numbers of rea-
sons for this, including high quotas and high prices in traditional fisheries [19].
6 This regulation also regulates fishing depth, sorting, gear, pumps, transport,
restitution and storage pens, and health checks [22].
7 Although storage less than 12 weeks is not strictly linked to aquaculture, as
it does not require an aquaculture license, in this paper we include this part of
the production in what we term “the CBA business”.
8 The NFSO sets the price for all categories of cod, including CBA cod.
9We define transaction cost here as 1) collection and exchange of informa-
tion, 2) negotiation and termination of contracts, 3) reduction of uncertainty, 4)
future developments, 5) securing loyal transaction partners, 6) specialization in
location, 7) specific assets and 8) human capital [24].
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formal competence, in accordance with the AA [22–24]. Hence, in-
tegrating forward (model 2) requires a significant investment in tan-
gible and intangible assets.
3.2.3. Backward integration
In the third model in Fig. 2, actors within traditional fish farming or
processing/sales integrate backwards, into aquaculture (over 12
weeks), live storage (under 12 weeks) and even into capture fisheries.
The objective of integrating backwards may be to gain control over the
supply chain or to avoid competition with other actors for raw material,
especially if integrating into capture fisheries. The availability and
predictability of live cod may increase, but ownership of a fishing vessel
with quotas must comply with the Participation Act (PA), which pro-
tects the legal status of the fisher [12]. This requires three years of
active fishing in the last five years (c.f. § 6 in the PA). Moreover, as
fishing has become a professionalized and specialized full-time occu-
pation, is difficult to combine fishing with other occupations [33]. To
qualify as a fisher would be challenging and the PA therefore effectively
hinders backward integration. In addition, this model also requires
investments in aquaculture and storage facilities, or even fishing ves-
sels, as well as knowledge.
3.2.4. Full integration
The forth model in Fig. 2 shows a fully integrated business that
controls the entire process from capture, via live storage or farming,
into processing and sales. This model is inherently different from the
free market competition model (model 1), as actors are stable trans-
action partners and internalized, or vertically integrated in one pro-
duction system. Choice of transaction partners and conditions for
transactions lead to expectations and governance structures, which in
turn lead to stable long-term agreements and relations. In a fully in-
tegrated model, all legal aspects at the various steps in the value chain,
such as the PA and the AA, are fulfilled within an integrated company.
The level of complexity and risk, however, depends on the design of the
integrated model, including the rate of capital binding and financial
costs for running a fully integrated production system.
Independent of models, we assume that an actor will invest into
tangible and intangible assets if the expected return on investment (RoI)
of CBA compensates for the investments and increased risks involved
and is higher than the RoI in traditional fishery or aquaculture.10
4. Findings
As with the introduction of modern trawlers in the 1960 and 1970s,
CBA shall contribute to reducing seasonality in the cod fisheries. Fig. 3
shows the mass balance of live fish in 2016. Most of the fish was put
into live storage between February and May, while being continuously
taken out between March and July, with a peak in June. The fish was on
average stored 11 weeks [21]. Thus, in 2016 CBA did only marginally
affect the seasonal fluctuations in the NEA cod fishery, and did not
manage to reap the benefit of the higher cod prices in the fall
(Sept–Nov) [35]. The short time for live storage/feeding may also imply
that the fish did not gain significant weight and value. However, due
low landings in summer, CBA has had some effect in this period, as
36.5% of the landings in June 2016 were CBA cod [36]. The value
creation potential still lies in keeping more fish in storage for a longer
time (more than 12 weeks). However, this entails that more wild CBA
fish must become aquaculture fish, with requirements to legal defini-
tion, including storage time and formal competence.
In 2016, fourteen sites along the coast stored fish (less than 12
weeks). Six of these were fishers integrating forward into storage
(model 2); whereas eight were fish processors/buyers integrating
backward into live storage (model 3). In general, however, few actors
have integrated foreward and entered the storage business and even
fewer aquaculture, indicating the existence of entry barriers and high
transaction costs throughout the value chain. For fishers, the barriers
are complex regulations, low minimum price, as well as high risk and
uncertainty. The perceived barriers relates to high transaction costs
through extra investments, higher fish mortality, lower income and
more formal competence. Engagement in a live capture fishery is also a
choice between alternative uses of the vessels' quota-base [37]. Capture
of live fish is a more expensive endeavor, as it is more time and space
consuming, than traditional fisheries [38]. Hence, the greatest barrier
to entry is the relatively high profitability in traditional fisheries [16].
This is also likely to be the case for actors in aquaculture, as economic
results in salmon farming has been historically high in recent years
[39]. In this context, CBA does not represent a more economic viable
production system than traditional cod fisheries or salmon farming.
Entry barriers and transaction costs applies to actors who consider
backward integration in the value chain as well. In theory, to secure
and control the supply of live cod, it may make sense for fish processors
and buyers to integrate backwards into capture fisheries. As discussed
above (model 3), this is difficult, as the PA effectively regulates who
may own fishing vessels and quotas, with requirements to fishing ac-
tivity and competence [12]. Thus, due to regulative barriers, it is dif-
ficult for actors outside the traditional fishing fleet to enter capture
fisheries and thus integrating backwards past storage.
In terms of engagement in the aquaculture part of CBA, there were
in 2017 seven sites licensed for CBA (storage over 12 weeks), run by
five companies [40]. Four of these companies had their foundation in
fish processing or sales, whereas one company was not directly related
to fisheries or aquaculture. However, none of the licenses was active in
2016/2017 [21].11 Thus, few actors are presently set up to take ad-
vantage of the potential that apparently lies in storing fish over 12
weeks.
5. Discussion
The institutional framework in which CBA actors are operating is
complex and not compatible with the development of a new marine
industry. Regulations from different sectors that do not harmonize,
hinders new business models from developing.
However, several actors have applied for CBA licenses, but have
been rejected, mainly because of distance requirements to existing
aquaculture facilities or processing plants, due to infection risks related
Fig. 2. Alternative (ideal-type) production models in
CBA.
10 According to previous studies, the investment in redesign of a vessel is
expected to be between NOK 100,000 and 400,000 [20,34] (about US $
12,000–48,000).
11 Five of the three companies had no operating income in 2016, and two had
only marginal operating income, most likely from other activities [41].
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to these [42]. As increased distance between fishing grounds, proces-
sing facility and CBA pens is a matter of increased logistics and costs,
distance requirements increase transaction costs and are perceived by
some industry actors as unreasonable. As an actor said: “Localities and
licenses represent severe barriers, especially the distance requirements
are challenging” [16]. In addition to risk of infectious diseases, animal
welfare and hygiene are central to all regulations related to CBA
[22,23,43,44]. Consequently, the Norwegian Food Safety Authority is a
central institution controlling the development of CBA. In other words,
the development of CBA spans two different sectors, as well as several
ministries and directorates – complicating the matter further.
Independent of chosen production model, the higher minimum
price of live fish is presently not enough to compensate for the extra
investments, risk and time involved. In the capture fisheries, without
the quota-bonus, CBA actually represents a negative value creation,
compared to a more profitable use of the quota in the traditional fish-
eries [21,38]. Similarly, for fish processors, and especially fish farmers,
the alternative costs are perceived too high for CBA to become attrac-
tive.
In choice of business models, economic incentives, through the
quota-bonus, is a central feature of the present CBA system. However,
ever since its inception, it has been controversial, and the legitimacy of
the quota-bonus and the CBA has been questioned. Proponents are ar-
guing that the CBA and the quota-bonus are fulfilling the intentions,
whereas opponents see the quota-bonus as a subsidy to an unprofitable
industry. The Norwegian Seafood Federation and the Fish Buyers'
Association argues that the CBA and the quota-bonus have fulfilled the
intentions, as it has moved sales of fresh fish from winter to June–July.
For instance, in the fishing hamlet of Båtsfjord, the sale of 800 tons of
fresh fish was moved from May to September [45,46]. It argued for the
success of CBA and the quota-bonus, as cod has been stored in cages in
fourteen different places in Northern Norway, that 24 different vessels
landed live cod in 2016, and landings have increased from about 2000
tons in 2013 to 6000 tons in 2016 [47,48]. The full utilization of the
quota-bonus has also been argued as a success.
On the other side, actors question the success of the scheme and
whether the objectives are met. As the quota-bonus is deducted from
the national TAC, many stakeholders claim that the quota-bonus is a
subsidy of a new business and reallocation of quotas from the commons
to CBA fishers.12 The quota-bonus negatively affects the quota alloca-
tion in all fleet groups [49], but benefit only a few selected vessels, in
particular Danish seine vessels [48]. The quota-bonus also disturb the
geographical landings, as the counties of Finnmark and Troms receives
significant larger landings of live fish than Nordland [21]. An en-
trepreneur in the CBA business also questioned the legitimacy of the
quota-bonus scheme, as he said:
“the quota-bonus does not work as intended, as there is no CBA fish in
pens in the fall, and too many actors are in the business only to obtain
extra cod quotas from the quota-bonus scheme. Thus, the entire industry
is missing the overall idea of CBA: predicable and large supplies of fresh
fish to higher-paying markets outside the peak seasons” [50].
Similarly, Vestvågøy Fishermen's Association in Nordland County
argues that profitability should be a result of the CBA cod being sold at
a higher price, and questions whether this is the case and demands the
scheme to be discontinued [45]. Hence, due to diverging views among
stakeholders, the legitimacy of the quota-bonus and CBA is brought
onto the political agenda. The legitimacy of the quota-bonus scheme
accordingly links to the fragile, political compromises that maintain
stable resource allocation keys among different gear- and vessel groups
and regions. As the quota-bonus have been at work since 2008, with
little effect, the national council of the Norwegian Fishermen's Asso-
ciation (NFA) is negative to prolong the scheme. Nevertheless, members
of the NFA are engaged in CBA and the organization is reluctant to
oppose their own members, especially in the most fisheries-dependent
northernmost regions. In addition, a strong sub-organization of the
NFA, the deep-sea Vessel Owners' Association (Fiskebåt), is especially
negative to the quota-bonus. According to them, the CBA is not a viable
business and only reallocate cod quotas from all fishers (including own
members) to members of the coastal fleet group.
Moreover, CBA actors question the legitimacy of the 12-week rule,
as it is perceived as arbitrary. Hence, it has been suggested an expan-
sion of the rule, so fish can be store more than 12 weeks without an
aquaculture license [51]. This would allow CBA actors to store fish into
the fall and thus adapt and utilize production capacities in long-term
strategies – not only to earn short-term benefits of the quota-bonus.
The bottom line is that, although the quota-bonus is intended as an
incentive to stimulate the CBA-business, it is not sufficient as long as the
institutional framework is constraining the development of the new
industry.
6. Conclusion
From the results and the discussions above, we can conclude that
few actors are engaged in the CBA-business, and even fewer in the
Fig. 3. Mass balance of stored live NEA cod in 2016 [36].
12 For 2017, the bonus-quota of 4000 tons is about 1% of the total TAC [21].
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aquaculture-phase of CBA. It is a business in the making and business
models are still developing. Despite public incentives, the institutional
framework acts as a barrier to the development and expansion of CBA.
In general, in their present forms, the fisheries and aquaculture in-
stitutional frameworks do not seem congruent with the development of
new marine industries – which is a political objective [52]. Contra-
dictory governance structures and policies is not new. Jentoft and
Chuenpagdee [53] argued that fisheries and coastal governance is
complex and a “wicked” problem, leading to governance failure.
Wicked problems have no single solutions and tend to resurface and be
redefined and reframed by stakeholders. Similarly, Osmundsen et al.
[54]) studied the wickedness of aquaculture governance and points to
the dynamic nature of aquaculture production that creates uncertainty
and knowledge gaps, making governance complex.
CBA has proven more difficult than expected. It is perceived as risky
and uncertain. Thus, actors involved in CBA-business have suggested
liberalizing the regulations, particularly those related to aquaculture
and competence. However, except for the quota-bonus, little has
changed. Therefore, the institutional frameworks described here, are
examples of regulative institutions that are wary of radical changes,
offering solutions that are only incremental and only marginally deviate
from the status quo [55,56]. As a result, CBA regulations become ad hoc
and radical regulative changes, which will facilitate the development of
CBA, are unlikely.
A main difference between the two lines of production, traditional
fisheries and aquaculture, is the degree of control of the production
cycle [57]. According to Asche [58], increased control of the produc-
tion process has enabled productivity-enhancing innovation and growth
in aquaculture. However, CBA regulations per se do not allow actors the
full control of the production cycle. Hence, present regulations are
likely to limit the potential for innovation and productivity increase in
the new business [59–61].
Although CBA has only marginally reduced the seasonality of the
cod fisheries, to conclude that CBA has failed may be premature. The
main institutional challenges is the development of an institutional
design and a regulatory framework tailor-made for CBA and small-scale
business structures. However, future institutional changes to facilitate
CBA development is also a framing process related to type of stake-
holders involved, who has the power to define problems and suggest
future solutions. Hence, several ministries and directorates should co-
operate to design a less complex institutional framework, but the CBA-
business also have to convince powerful stakeholders such as the NFA
and the Vessel Owner Association that this is a business worth investing
in.
Besides the complexities discussed above, a removal of the quota-
bonus may negatively affect on-going CBA activities. Recently, in the
national Regulatory Council, where quotas for 2019 are allocated, the
Director of Fisheries suggested a gradual reduction in the CBA quota-
bonus, with only a 20% quota-bonus in 2023 [62]. With continued
existence of the institutional barriers, this decision is likely to have a
decisive effect for the future status of CBA.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.02.039.
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